人力资源工龄买断价格博弈分析

journal6 ›› 2005, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (2): 47-50.

人力资源工龄买断价格博弈分析

（重庆大学经济与工商管理学院，四川重庆 400044）

出版日期:2005-04-15 发布日期:2012-09-22
作者简介:雷勇（1965-），男，重庆市人，重庆市涪陵师范学院副教授，重庆大学博士生，主要从事数量经济、技术经济及人力资源管理方面研究.
基金资助:
教育部博士点基金资助项目(20020611009)；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(02JA790062)

Analysis of Game Theory on the Price of Layoff Mechanism for Human Resource

(College of Economics & Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,Sichuan China)

Online:2005-04-15 Published:2012-09-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要：提出了用博弈论方法处理人力资源管理中的工龄买断定价问题的新思路，阐述员工工龄买断的二种主要思路和一个充要条件.在企业与员工双方对买断估价信息不完全和采用线性战略条件下，分别讨论工龄买断非仲裁定价与仲裁定价2种不同博弈行为.研究表明：非仲裁定价博弈双方的最优战略仍是线性战略，仲裁定价博弈双方的最优战略仅是采取单一基准价格战略，员工三种收入函数的数量化是确定工龄买断定价的基础.

关键词： 工龄买断, 定价博弈, 线性战略, 纳什均衡

Abstract: The new thought of using game theory to study the price of layoff mechanism for human resource management was put forward.Two main ideas on layoff mechanism and one sufficient and necessary condition of layoff mechanism were introduced.Under the conditions of imperfect information and linear stratagems for enterprise and employee,two games as non-arbitrage and arbitrage price on the layoff were discussed.The research showed that the dominant stratagems were linear on non-arbitrage game and single prices on arbitrage game for enterprise and employee.The base of the pricing of layoff mechanism is to quantitate three kinds of income functions.

Key words: layoff mechanism, price game, linear stratagem, Nash equilibrium

雷勇, 蒲勇健. 人力资源工龄买断价格博弈分析[J]. journal6, 2005, 26(2): 47-50.

LEI Yong, PU Yong-Jian. Analysis of Game Theory on the Price of Layoff Mechanism for Human Resource[J]. journal6, 2005, 26(2): 47-50.