基于动态博弈的员工培训风险控制条件透析

journal6 ›› 2009, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (4): 113-116.

基于动态博弈的员工培训风险控制条件透析

(吉首大学商学院，湖南吉首 416000)

出版日期:2009-07-25 发布日期:2012-04-22
作者简介:钟高峥（1964-），男，吉首大学商学院副教授，硕士，主要从事博弈与组织行为研究.

Condition Analysis of Training Risk Control Based on Dynamic Game

（College of Business,Jishou University,Jishou 416000,Hunan China）

Online:2009-07-25 Published:2012-04-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要：从动态博弈视角看，员工培训的风险主要表现在受训后员工的市场价值增加而可能出现的离任与企业利益受损的冲突，因而企业对员工培训的风险控制条件应是谋求企业培训和员工留任的动态利益均衡.

关键词： 员工培训, 风险控制, 动态博弈, 博弈树

Abstract: From the perspective of dynamic game,staff training risk mainly lies in the contradiction between the enterprises interest loss and the staff resignation due to their market value increase after training.Therefore,staff training risk control must aim at striving for the dynamic balance between staff training and staff retention.

Key words: staff training, risk control, dynamic game, game tree

钟高峥. 基于动态博弈的员工培训风险控制条件透析[J]. journal6, 2009, 30(4): 113-116.

ZHONG Gao-Zheng. Condition Analysis of Training Risk Control Based on Dynamic Game[J]. journal6, 2009, 30(4): 113-116.

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